Note: Some friends have reminded me there are versions of divine command theory that don’t require God’s ability to make any action right. So, below, read my criticisms only aimed at Craig’s particular version.
William Lane Craig recently went on Alex O’Connor’s podcast to discuss the Canaanite slaughter in the book of Joshua. In the episode, Craig argues that there is no incompatibility between (1) God’s perfect goodness and justice, and (2) God’s commanding the Israelites to wipe out the Canaanites.
In sum, the reason there is no incompatibility is because divine command theory is true. Here is how Craig explains the view and why it solves the alleged incompatibility between (1) and (2):
According to the version of divine command ethics which I’ve defended, our moral duties are constituted by the commands of a holy and loving God. Since God doesn’t issue commands to Himself, He has no moral duties to fulfill. He is certainly not subject to the same moral obligations and prohibitions that we are. For example, I have no right to take an innocent life. For me to do so would be murder. But God has no such prohibition. He can give and take life as He chooses.
What that implies is that God has the right to take the lives of the Canaanites when He sees fit. How long they live and when they die is up to Him.
[…]
On divine command theory, then, God has the right to command an act, which, in the absence of a divine command, would have been sin, but which is now morally obligatory in virtue of that command.
This version of divine command theory solves the incompatibility. After all, it says God has the right to command any action, even those that would be sinful without a divine command. In the Canaanite case, Israel’s wiping out of the Canaanites would have been sinful were it not for God’s command to carry out the action. But without that command, Israel would’ve been sinning.
There has been good work on whether this episode counts as a genocide, or whether the Canaanite people were so morally monstrous that they deserved to get wiped out. I will leave this debate to the biblical exegetes and historians of the Ancient Near East.
Instead, I am interested in Craig’s claim that “God has the right to command an act, which, in the absence of a divine command, would have been sin, but which is now morally obligatory in virtue of that command.” To put it mildly, I think this view is insane. Think of the most morally depraved action possible: If God commanded you to do it, you would be morally required to do it.
This is not a new objection and divine command theorists have written a lot about it. But Craig’s interview with O’Connor reminded me that I’ve never been convinced by their responses. For example, Alex asks Craig at one point if he thinks a divine command aimed at murdering a child would make that action morally obligatory. Craig answers in the affirmative, but then adds something like this:
While monstrous actions would be morally obligatory if God commanded us to do them, God would never command those actions because they are incompatible with his perfectly good nature. After all, “Christians hold that God’s holy and loving nature determines what He commands.”
The idea is this: even though God has the normative power to make any action obligatory just by commanding it, his perfect nature keeps him from ever exercising that power in a way that is incompatible with his perfect nature. As long as this is true, there is no incompatibility between (1) and (2).
I grant that Craig has solved the incompatibility between (1) and (2) by affirming (3)—that divine command theory is true. But this is a cheap victory. After all, resolving tensions is not all that impressive if the reconciliation relies on another idea that is deeply implausible. Here, I’ll give it a try: There is no incompatibility between (1)* I am a good person and (2)* I just murdered someone. After all, this other claim is also true: (3)* Good people can murder whoever they want. Tension resolved!
I see Craig more or less doing the same thing. Just think about how radical a claim divine command theorists are making: Anything God commands is obligatory. Of course that is going to resolve a lot of tensions, just like the idea that good people can murder whoever they want will also solve a lot of tensions. The real interesting question, though, is whether the reconciling claim is actually true.
Here is one reason to think it’s not. Divine command theorists rely on God having the legitimate authority to issue commands that make actions morally obligatory. Here is one prominent divine command theorist saying just that:
[Divine command theory] requires that God possess legitimate authority, so that his commands (or expressed requirements) establish obligations for his human creatures. But it is clear that some normative principle or principles must be the basis of this authority. For a [divine command theory] to be plausible, there must be some reasonable answer to the question, “Why should a human being obey the commands of God?” (Evans 2014, 64).
Divine command theorists have trouble with two things regarding authority: (1) Their arguments for why God has authority over us do not succeed. Divine authority does not appear to follow from any of God’s perfections, nor does it follow from standard moral principles that ground authority in other contexts (e.g., consent, gratitude, property, etc.).
But Craig’s recent interview makes me realize there is an additional problem: (2) Even if they succeed in showing God does, in fact, have authority over us, they also need to show that the domain of his authority ranges over all actions. That is the only way to make sense of their claim that God could make any action rightful just by commanding it.
Every case of practical authority has a restricted domain. Parental authority, for example, covers a wide range of domains in a child’s life: what they eat, what they wear, their bedtimes, etc. But we know that a) there are actions beyond the purview of parental authority (e.g., parents cannot rightfully sell their children into slavery) and b) this authority will eventually dissipate once the child reaches a certain developmental point in their lives. Political authority also has this domain restriction: legitimate states might be able to tax us to fund public roads, but they can’t use tax funds for their own personal entertainment. Consenting to authority also has this restriction: placing myself under my doctor’s authority means he has a say-so over the part of my life relating to my health, not which car I drive or which stocks I should invest in. And so on.
Divine command theorists will no doubt say God has authority over us, and that this authority is unique in that it ranges over all actions. But they have to explain why the domain of divine authority is unrestricted while every other case of practical authority is restricted. The bad news for divine command theorists is that there is no plausible account of divine authority that ranges over every possible action. Not one!
Here is more reason to think divine authority probably doesn’t range over every action.1 Republicanists have rightfully pointed out that some authority structures are unjust even if the authority-holder in question is benevolent. Think of a benevolent slave-owner who has full legal rights over a slave to do whatever he wants to him, but chooses benevolently to treat the slave well. Or, think about older marriage laws that permitted them to do evil things to their wives even if the husband benevolently decided not to do those things. Similarly, think about God having full authority to command the most vile things possible but choosing not to do so out of his benevolence. In the first two cases, the authority arrangement is unjust and ought to be disbanded because it seems nobody has the right to have slaves or disrespect wives. Why should we think any differently about the divine command theorist’s view of divine authority, one that ranges over every possible action?
(One more thing. Craig has this to say about the innocent children slaughtered at Canaan:
Moreover, if we believe, as I do, that God’s grace is extended to those who die in infancy or as small children, the death of these children was actually their salvation. We are so wedded to an earthly, naturalistic perspective that we forget that those who die are happy to quit this earth for heaven’s incomparable joy. Therefore, God does these children no wrong in taking their lives.
Craig actually doesn’t get to say this. In his view, actions are only wrong if they transgress a divine command. This means heaven has nothing to do with whether these children are wronged. These children are not wronged regardless of where they go in the afterlife: Hell, Sheol, Purgatory, or Heaven. No matter. As long as no divine commands are transgressed, they’ve not been wronged.)
I am glad that if God really had this authority, his perfection would preclude him from exercising it for any kind of action. Thank God! But I don’t see this as the win that divine command theorists typically say it is. Whatever authority God has, it’s implausible to think it ranges over every action.
I have heard that Toni Alimi is working on the question of whether God dominates us in the Republicanist sense, so I assume Alimi has already written and thought about this point.
Great post. I'm sure you've read some of Wes Morriston's critiques of DCT? I find his work, and the work of Jeremy Koons and Jason Thibodeau to be quite decisive on this subject.
Craig is a man whose version of apologetics involve making everything as convoluted as can be. Simpler explanation: The universe is God’s. God has no sin in Him. God hates sin. All humans have sinned and are evil and are guilty. God could strike us all down instantaneously and send us to hell and would be just, good, and correct. We have no right to life, God creates us and gives us the chance and information needed to repent and turn to Him. In which case He lavishes us with undeserved mercy and grace. If we dont then we remain guilty and continue in our sins. Every breath we breathe is mercy from God. You are guilty and deserve death. Repent and pray for mercy.
In the Canaanite example, God can use any army He wants to strike down another nation, just as He used Babylon to strike down the sinful Israelites. What are some of the things that the Canaanites were doing that were evil thus making God want to crush them and drive them from the land? Read Leviticus 18: Parental incest, sodomy, abortion, beastiality, all manner of sexual sin and desecration of God’s creation and design. Its God’s universe with God’s rules, and if He says “dont have sex with animals” and then the Canaanites do so, He is in no way unjust for striking them down.
Similarly, the people of Sodom tried to butt-rape some angels in Genesis 18, so God rained down fire and destroyed them.
A worldview that doesn’t acknowledge your own sinfulness and the sinfulness of all humans will never understand God’s sovereignty. But when you understand that God extinguishing evil is in fact justice, you will understand the universe much better, and then when you realize that God’s mercy is above and beyond and comes purely from His love for us that exceeds sheer justice. This great Mercy and Love displayed in the flesh by God the Son Jesus Christ brutally dying on a cross to save YOUR soul, and creating possible reconciliation with God through His suffering, death, and His triumphant resurrection. He has paid it all so that you might be forgiven of your sins and made right with God, you didnt earn it and your own actions condemn you, but the penalty has already been paid for those who put their faith and life and loyalty in the glorious righteous Lord Jesus Christ.
Please pray on these matters and read the Gospel of Matthew. This is the truth of the universe, and it is not the will of the Father that any should perish